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Abstract 
Labor informality is a pervasive characteristic of the labor markets in Latin 
America, and a central issue in the public policy debate. This paper discusses the 
concept of labor informality and implements alternative definitions using 
microdata from around 300 national household surveys in all Latin American 
countries. The analysis covers two decades: while labor informality, defined as 
lack of social protection related to employment, remained with few changes in the 
1990s, there is a discernible downward pattern during the 2000s in most countries. 
These movements reveal a counter-cyclical behavior of labor informality, that may 
be linked to segmentation in the labor market.     
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1. Introduction 
Labor informality is a pervasive characteristic of the Latin American economies. Most 
workers in the region are self-employed or salaried workers in small, precarious firms 
without a signed contract in compliance with the labor regulations, and without access 
to protection against health and unemployment shocks, to savings for old age, to 
employment protection and to labor related benefits. This is the typical situation for an 
unskilled Latin American worker, but in fact a sizeable share of skilled workers is in 
similar labor conditions. Despite some improvements in the last decade of economic 
growth, labor informality continues to be a key feature of the Latin American labor 
markets and a central concern for public policy. The debate on the size of the informal 
sector, its welfare implications and the adequate policy prescriptions is livelier than ever 
both in the academic and policy arena.  
This paper makes a contribution to that debate by presenting evidence on the main 
patterns and trends of labor informality in Latin America, and discussing some of its 
main determinants. Unlike most existing studies that concentrate on a particular 
economy, in this paper we take a regional perspective and discuss evidence for all Latin 
American countries. The evidence is based on microdata from a large set of nearly 300 
national household surveys from all Latin American countries covering two decades: 
the 1990s, a decade of structural transformations, moderate growth and weak labor 
regulations, and the 2000s, a decade of higher economic growth, and stronger labor and 
social policies. By displaying a general picture of informality in the region we expect to 
contribute to a more informed discussion of labor markets and employment policies in 
Latin America.     
The debate on labor informality is often obscured by the fact that the term informality is 
ambiguous from a theoretical point of view, and difficult to implement empirically. In 
section 2 we discuss the concept of labor informality and the alternatives to empirically 
estimate it with data from the national household surveys. Section 3 is the core of the 
paper, as it presents the main patterns and trends of labor informality in the region, 
using alternative definitions. In section 4 we look at wages and hours of work of 
informal workers. In particular, we provide estimates of the conditional wage gap 
formal/informal by estimating multivariate probit models. Section 5 extends the analysis 
to assess whether the minimum wage, in principle only relevant for the formal sector, 
has a lighthouse effect for the wages in the informal sector.  
Disentangling all the forces that drive informality is a very difficult task. In this paper 
we make a contribution by analyzing two factors that have been identified as relevant 
determinants: the business cycle and the employment structure of the economy. In 
section 6 we analyze changes in informality over the business cycle to assess whether 
informal employment moves pro or anti-cyclically with the economy and relative wages 
across sectors, while in section 7 we perform counterfactual micro-simulations to 
characterize the relevance of changes in the structure of employment and other variables 
as driving factors behind informality. Section 8 closes with a summary and concluding 
comment.  
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2. Concept and measurement  
Academics, policy-makers and commentators extensively argue about labor informality 
and its policy implications.1 The debate, however, is often obscured by the fact that 
informality usually means different things to different people. ”Informality is a term that 
has the dubious distinction of combining maximum policy importance and political 
salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in the analytical literature” 
(Kanbur, 2009). 
There are at least two different concepts that are referred by the term labor informality.2 
The “social protection” definition stresses the lack of labor protection and social 
security benefits; while the “productive” definition pictures informal workers as those in 
low-productivity, unskilled, marginal jobs.3 The social protection definition is 
concerned with the compliance of the labor relationship with some rules, mainly labor 
protection, while the productive definition is concerned with the type of job (e.g. 
salaried vs. self-employed, large vs. small firms). The social protection definition of 
labor informality is theoretically more precise, and more relevant for most discussions 
concerning social and labor policy. For these reasons, this paper mostly deals with that 
alternative, although we complement the analysis with results using the productive 
definition.  
 
2.1. The social protection definition 
Under the social protection definition, informal firms are those not complying with the 
norms in terms of labor contracts, labor taxes, and labor regulations, and then their 
workers have no rights to labor protection or social benefits linked to employment. ILO 
(2002) defines an informal worker as one “whose labor relationship is not subject to 
labor legislation and tax rules, and has no access to social protection or right to certain 
labor benefits”.4  
This notion is difficult to implement empirically. There are at least two problems. The 
first one arises from the fact that the number of dimensions to be included under labor 
protection and social security is large and varies across countries. Labor protection 
includes contracts, severance payments, advance notice, right to be unionized, 
workplace safety, vacations, working hours and many more. Social security includes 
pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance and other insurances and benefits. 
Countries differ in the extent of their labor protection and social security systems. 
                                                 
1
 The theoretical discussion is mostly taken from Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009).  
2 See Fields (1990), Portes and Schauffler (1993), Pradhan and van Soest (1995), Saavedra and Chong 
(1999), Maloney (1999), Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006), Henley et al. (2006), Levy (2008), and Kanbur 
(2009) for surveys and discussions. 
3
 In recent volume, Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006) also link informality to the degree of 
structuring of the organization.  
4
 See also Merrick (1976), Portes et al. (1986) and Saavedra and Chong (1999).  
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Moreover, even in a given country regulations and social security rights differ by sector, 
by tenure, or other work characteristics, and change over time. Therefore, it is difficult 
in theory to come up with a social protection definition of a formal worker that is 
suitable for all countries and situations.  
The second problem is practical. Even if we agree to a simple definition of an informal 
worker, household surveys widely differ in terms of coverage of labor protection and 
social security issues. Some surveys ask about contracts and some do not. The type of 
questions aimed at capturing the right to health insurance is very different across 
countries, and in some cases it is impossible to know whether health insurance is linked 
to employment. The coverage on severance payments and unemployment insurance is 
very low, while the questions on insurance for accidents in the workplace are almost 
inexistent. In fact many Latin American countries do not have comprehensive systems 
of insurances on many risks (including unemployment), so the National Statistical 
Offices do not include questions on these issues.  
The right to receive a pension when retired is the social security benefit most asked in 
the Latin American household surveys. In fact, nearly all surveys in the region include a 
question capturing access to retirement benefits. For that reason we implement the 
following social protection definition of informality: a worker is informal if s(he) does 
not have the right to a pension linked to her/his employment when retired.  
In the appendix 1 we provide information on the type of question included in each 
country/year to implement the social protection definition of informality. Unfortunately, 
the questions are not identical, a fact that introduces noise in the comparisons. 
Moreover, in some countries the questions apply only to salaried workers, leaving all 
the self-employed as missing.  
 
2.2.The productive definition 
The productive view classifies as informal those workers in low-productivity jobs in 
marginal small-scale and often family-based activities. ILO (1991) defines the informal 
sector as economic units “with scarce or even no capital, using primitive technologies 
and unskilled labor, and then with low productivity”. Maloney (2004) includes in the 
informal sector the “small-scale, semi-legal, often low-productivity, frequently family-
based, perhaps pre-capitalistic enterprises”.  
Naturally, it is also very difficult to empirically implement this notion, since things like 
“productivity” are unobservables, others like “capital endowment” are not usually 
reported in surveys, and others like “marginal”, “pre-capitalistic activities” or “primitive 
technologies” are difficult to define.  
In practice researchers have tried to adjust this notion of informality to the information 
usually contained in surveys. Hence, the empirical implementation of informality has 
been linked to (i) the type of job (salaried, self-employment), (ii) the type of economic 
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unit (small, large, public sector), (iii) and the worker’s skills. Following this practice we 
divide the working population into 7 groups:  
1. Entrepreneurs (patrones) 
2. Salaried workers in large private firms  
3. Salaried workers in the public sector 
4. Salaried workers in small private firms 
5. Skilled self-employed 
6. Unskilled self-employed 
7. Zero-income workers 
To implement this classification we include as unskilled all individuals without a 
tertiary or superior education degree, and we define as small all firms with 5 or fewer 
employees.5 Given that an individual could have more than one job, we apply the 
classification only to his/her main occupation. We implement the following productive 
definition of labor informality: a worker is informal if (s)he belongs to any of the 
following categories: (i) unskilled self-employed, (ii) salaried worker in a small 
(private) firm or (iii)  zero-income worker.   
Labor informality is closely related to self-employment. However, we exclude the self-
employed with a tertiary degree from the group of informal workers. The group of 
skilled self-employed is mainly comprised by professionals and technicians usually with 
high productivity and fully incorporated into the modern economy. In fact, the 
professional self-employed is the group with the highest earnings in many countries in 
the region (see section 4).  
Following a standard practice, we include salaried workers in small firms into the 
definition of informality. The assumption, which of course is debatable, is that most 
salaried workers in those firms operate using primitive technologies and with low 
productivity. In fact, many of these small firms are run by individuals who declare 
themselves being self-employed.  
Finally, we also add the group of zero-income workers into the informal sector. 
Household surveys in the region have this category to include mostly family workers, 
i.e. individuals who perform some activity in a family-based enterprise but who are not 
formally paid for that job.  
The inclusion of entrepreneurs/employers (patrones) into the formal sector is debatable, 
since in practice some of them are just self-employed in a low-productivity activity 
using scarce capital and some few unskilled workers. There are two practical problems 
regarding this group: (i) it is difficult (probably impossible) in theory to set a line 
separating out the entrepreneurs from just the self-employed employing some workers, 
                                                 
5
 Given differences in surveys, the cut-off point is not 5 employees in all countries. 
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and (ii) even when we attempt to do it, there are some data limitations. For instance, 
most surveys do not report the number of employees working for a patrón. We have 
decided to include the entrepreneurs into the formal sector following a usual practice, 
and because earnings in that group are much higher than for the self-employed in all 
Latin American countries.6  
This discussion confirms that the productive definition of labor informality is 
theoretically weak and empirically difficult to implement. However, it has lasted for 
decades and it is extensively used in the academic and policy debate, because it refers, 
although in an ambiguous way, to a relevant characteristic of the labor market in Latin 
America.  
The productive and social protection definitions of informality are highly correlated. 
The next section shows statistics on both definitions and discusses the possible 
overlapping.  
 
3. Trends in Latin America  
This section documents the recent trends of labor informality for all countries in Latin 
America using both definitions discussed in the previous section. Prior to this analysis, 
we describe the main data used for the estimations.   
 
3.1.  The data 
All the statistics in this paper are obtained by processing microdata from household 
surveys, which are part of the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed by CEDLAS at the Universidad Nacional de 
La Plata and the World Bank’s LAC poverty and gender group (LCSPP). SEDLAC 
contains information on almost 300 household surveys in 25 LAC countries. Table 3.1 
shows information on the 17 surveys used in the study. The sample covers all countries 
in mainland Latin America (with the exception of Guatemala), and one of the largest 
countries in the Caribbean, Dominican Republic. Most household surveys included in 
the sample are nationally representative. The two exceptions are Uruguay before 2006 
and Argentina, where surveys cover only the urban population, which nonetheless 
represents more than 85% of the total population in both countries.   
Household surveys are not uniform across Latin America. All possible efforts have been 
exerted to make statistics comparable across countries and over time by using similar 
definitions of variables in each country/year, and by applying consistent methods of 
processing the data. However, perfect comparability is far from being assured. A trade-
off between accuracy and coverage arises. The particular solution adopted contains an 
                                                 
6
 Henley et al. (2006) divide employers in Brazil into formal and informal according to the type of 
occupation. We are not able to apply a similar methodology to most countries in our sample.  
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unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. The aim has been to remain ambitious enough to 
include as many countries as possible in the analysis, and accurate enough so not to 
push the comparisons too much. In any case, we provide the reader with relevant 
information to assess the trade-offs. 
 
3.2.  Trends in informality I (social protection definition) 
The definition of informality based on access to social protection can be instrumented in 
15 countries. Moreover, several of them have asked the required questions only in some 
years, and in around half of them the information is limited to the set of salaried 
workers. The specific questions devoted to capture labor informality from a social 
protection perspective are different across countries (appendix 1), a fact that generates 
comparability problems. If countries agreed to a basic set of questions concerning this 
issue, our understanding of informality and social protection in the region would be 
substantially more precise.   
 
Informality in salaried employment  
We start by implementing the definition of labor informality only for salaried workers, 
and then extend it to all workers but limiting the sample to the 7 countries that allow 
doing so. Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of salaried workers without access to social 
protection (i.e., without the right to receive pensions when retired). The share of 
informal workers with this definition is relatively low in Chile and Uruguay (22% and 
19% respectively), and somewhat higher in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela (between 25% and 35% approximately).  
 
Figure 3.1 
Informality rates – Social-protection definition 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
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On the other hand, labor informality is higher than 60% in Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay. With a rate of around 45% Colombia stands as a country with an 
intermediate level of labor informality. Despite significant improvements in the last few 
years, Ecuador and Peru still show a high incidence of labor informality, with rates 
around 55%. El Salvador has similar levels of informal employment, though informality 
has been rising in recent years.  
Understanding the deep determinants of informality is a difficult task. However, the 
evidence strongly points to some general basic facts: labor informality is positively 
associated to the economic development and the productive structure of a country. 
Figure 3.2 shows that labor informality is negatively correlated to per capita GDP (at 
PPP) and positively correlated to the share of rural population in the survey. Two 
interesting cases are worth mentioning from the first panel: in Mexico the level of 
informality greatly exceeds the expected value given the level of per capita GDP, while 
in Dominican Republic the opposite result is observed.  
 
Figure 3.2 
Informality (social protection) and per capita GDP, and share of rural population 
in the household survey  
 
A. Informality (social protection) and per capita GDP 
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B. Informality (social protection) and share of rural population 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
 
Changes in labor informality have been neither smooth over time nor homogeneous 
across countries (table 3.2 and figure 3.3). However, a clear picture of different patterns 
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in the two decades covered in the study emerges: while in the 1990s labor informality 
did not change or even increased in some countries, in the 2000s most economies 
managed to raise the level of social protection of their salaried workers. The contrast 
between decades is evident in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay 
and Venezuela, countries that have data that spans over the entire period. Informality 
has also fallen in countries with data only for the 2000s: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay. In contrast, El Salvador and Mexico seem to be 
the countries with the worst performance, showing no signs of fall in labor informality.   
Figure 3.4, constructed with data for the eight countries with information since the early 
1990s shows the contrast: on average labor informality increased one point in the 1990s, 
and fell 5 points in the 2000s for that set of countries.  
 
Figure 3.4 
Informality in Latin America 1990-2010 
Social protection definition 
Salaried workers 
44.4
45.4
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).  
Note: estimates for eight countries with data that spans over the two decades. Unweighted mean for Latin 
America.  
 
Figure 3.5 restricts the analysis to the last decade. This period is particularly interesting 
since it covers years of strong economic growth, job creation and significant 
improvement in terms of poverty and inequality in the income distribution (Cruces, 
Gasparini y Tornarolli, 2011). The evidence suggests a moderate reduction in the 
incidence of labor informality since the early 2000s. On average, the share of 
unprotected wage earners in Latin America fell 4.3 points in the decade (the fall in the 
weighted mean was 3.2).  
The most outstanding case is Peru, with the greatest reduction in the rate of informality. 
However, due to the high starting point, labor informality remains to be a significant 
issue in that Andean country. Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay have also performed well in 
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the last decade. Other countries that show a positive performance are Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela, though the improvements have been relatively 
small.  
Bolivia, El Salvador and Mexico are the countries with the worst performances over the 
past ten years, experiencing an increase in the rate of informal employment. However, 
while Bolivia presents a reduction in informality by the end of the period, the opposite 
results are found for El Salvador and Mexico. In fact, Mexico is the country with the 
highest increase in informality.   
 
Figure 3.5 
Change in informality rate 2000-2010 
Social protection definition 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
Informality including the self-employed  
So far, we restricted the analysis to the set of salaried workers, since in several countries 
the questions included in the surveys are limited to that group. In this section we expand 
the analysis to all workers by first limiting the sample to seven countries with more 
ambitious questionnaires, and second making assumptions about informality for the 
self-employed.  
Some household surveys have questions on social protection linked to employment to 
be answered by all workers, including the self-employed. Since these workers are 
typically not covered by a contributory social protection system, labor informality 
figures for all workers are significantly higher than for the set of wage earners (figure 
3.6). The main results are invariant when extending the definition of informality to all 
workers. The ranking across countries is just slightly changed: for instance Costa Rica 
with a somewhat higher share of unprotected wage earners than Brazil, has a lower 
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share of self-employed, and hence a lower rate of labor informality when computed over 
the entire population of workers.  
 
Figure 3.6 
Informality Rates - Social protection definition 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
 
The labor informality trends are also consistent when limiting the sample to wage 
earners or when considering also the self-employed (table 3.3 and figure 3.7). Brazil and 
Peru stand among the most successful experiences in terms of reducing informality in 
the region.  
We implement an alternative to obtain rough estimates of labor informality for all 
workers by assuming that all self-employed that are not professional (complete college 
education) are not covered by social protection linked to employment (table 3.4 and 
figure 3.8). As shown in the following section that is in fact the situation for nearly all 
the unskilled self-employed. The case for the skilled self-employed is less clear so we 
decided to leave this group and the group of entrepreneurs out of the calculations. 
There are few changes in the national ranking when implementing this definition of 
informality (figure 3.9). Paraguay and Peru climb some positions given the large size of 
their self-employed workforce, while Chile reaches the last position in this ranking.  
The linear correlation between both definitions of informality is 0.91, and the Spearman 
correlation coefficient is 0.86. 
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Figure 3.9 
Informality Rates - Social Protection Definition 
All workers – all self-employed considered as informal 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
 
The general picture of labor informality trends is not modified when assuming that all 
not-professional self-employed are unprotected (figure 3.10). The share of informal 
workers climbed around 1 point in the 1990s and fell around 5 points in the 2000s.  
 
Figure 3.10 
Informality in Latin America, 1990-2010 
Social protection definition 
All workers 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).  
Note: estimates for eight countries with data that spans over the two decades. Unweighted mean for Latin 
America.  
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Without some few exceptions, the performance in the last decade was positive (figure 
3.11). Again, Brazil and Peru stand as the most successful cases, while El Salvador and 
Mexico have the most worrisome statistics.  
 
Figure 3.11 
Change in Informality Rate 2000-2010 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
3.3.  Trends in informality II (productive definition) 
In this section we provide some evidence on the level and trend of labor informality, 
defined from a productive perspective. Table 3.5 shows the share of workers in each of 
the seven labor categories defined in the previous section, according to the type of work. 
There are some differences between countries that are worth mentioning. The share of 
workers who are employed in large firms is over 32% in seven of the countries analyzed 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay). Chile, with 
46.5%, is by far the country with the highest proportion of workers in this category. On 
the other hand, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru have less than 20% of workers 
employed in this type of firms. In general, the share of workers in large firms is lower in 
less developed and more rural countries.  
Public sector employees stand for more than 10% of the occupied labor force in the 
most developed countries of the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. In the remaining 
countries, that group of workers accounts for 5% to 9% of total employment.  
Self-employed professionals represent a minor proportion of the workforce in all the 
countries in our sample. Their share over total employment only exceeds 3% in 
Argentina, Colombia and Peru.  
Although the unskilled self-employed are a sizeable group in all economies, the 
importance of this category of workers in total employment varies across countries. In 
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Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, the unskilled self-employed constitute the main 
employment category, ranging from a proportion of 29.2% in El Salvador to 40.2% in 
Dominican Republic. On the contrary, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Mexico less than 20% of the workers belong to this group. 
Salaried workers in small firms represent between 10.3% of the total employment (in 
Bolivia) and 26.2% (in Mexico). There is not a clear pattern linking development to the 
size of this group: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have a proportion of salaried workers 
in small firms similar to that from Ecuador, Honduras and Paraguay, while the share in 
Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Peru is almost identical.  
Zero-income workers represent an important proportion of the labor force in countries 
with a large share of the population living in rural areas. That is the case of Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, where at least 10% of 
the workforce are unpaid workers.  
The employment structure does not dramatically change when restricting the analysis to 
urban areas (Table 3.6). The main differences are the higher share of workers in large 
firms and the public sector in urban areas, and the higher proportion of unskilled self-
employed and, in particular, zero-income workers in rural areas.  
The results presented in the previous paragraphs suggest the existence of large 
differences between countries regarding informality rates, when applying the productive 
definition. Data depicted in figure 3.12 corroborates this assertion. The proportion of 
informal workers exceeds 58% in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, and it is below 40% in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Uruguay. Meanwhile, levels of informality are between 43% and 54% in Brazil, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela.  
 
Figure 3.12 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
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Once again, informality using this approach seems to be negatively correlated to per 
capita GDP and positively correlated to the share of rural population in the survey 
(figure 3.13).   
 
Figure 3.13 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). Data for 2010 or closer 
year with information. 
 
Figure 3.14 and table 3.7 show the evolution of labor informality using the productive 
definition. For some countries the trend can be depicted since 1990, while in others this 
exercise can only be done for the last decade. The contrast between decades found for 
the social protection definition is not that clear for the productive definition: in some 
countries the pattern was different between decades but the difference was rather small, 
while in others the labor structure remained roughly unchanged. However, when taking 
the average the result of previous sections applies: labor informality slightly increased 
(or remained unchanged) in the 1990s and fell in the 2000s (figure 3.15). In almost all 
countries, labor informality defined from a productive perspective is lower now than it 
was two decades ago, although for most economies the reduction has been far from 
spectacular.    
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Figure 3.15 
Informality in Latin America, 1990-2010 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).  
Note: estimates for eight countries with data that spans over the two decades. Unweighted mean for Latin 
America.  
 
3.4.  Comparing the two definitions  
In this section results using both definitions of labor informality are analyzed to assess 
the overlapping. Table 3.8 shows the proportion of workers identified as informal by the 
social protection definition (i.e. workers without the right to receive a pension when 
retired), by labor category (i.e. the basis for the productive definition of informality). 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results. In the first place, a high proportion 
of individuals classified as formal by the productive definition do not have the right to a 
pension when retired. Even within the public sector, pensions do not appear to be a 
universal right since more than 10% of the salaried public sector workers are not 
entitled to a pension in 9 out of the 16 countries in the sample. This fraction rises 
sharply for the other two formal labor categories. In particular, the proportion of self-
employed professionals without right to pensions is remarkably high (around 90% in 
many countries). The share of unprotected large-firms employees is also high on 
average, though with important variations across countries: this proportion is around 15-
20% in the Southern Cone, but climbs to 50% or more in Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay.   
Despite these discrepancies between the informality definitions, the vast majority of 
informal workers according to the productive approach are also considered to be 
informal following the social protection definition (the correlation coefficient is 0.852). 
The mapping is not perfect though, particularly for the salaried workers in small firms. 
In some countries, a significant proportion of these workers will actually have access to 
a pension when retired (around 25-30% in Argentina and Costa Rica, 38% in Brazil and 
Uruguay, 50% in Chile and 55% in Dominican Republic).  
Labor informality - CEDLAS 
 18
Table 3.9 also contributes to the comparison of the two definitions of informality. The 
last column shows the proportion of salaried workers which is consistently classified as 
formal or informal by the two definitions. On average, this fraction is over 76%. This 
share is higher when considering all workers (instead of just salaried workers). Only a 
small proportion of those classified as informal following the productive definition have 
access to social security (column (iii)). The relatively large social security systems in 
the Southern Cone account for most of these cases. In contrast, there is larger fraction of 
formal workers by the productive definition which are considered informal in the 
legalistic sense, which might be explained by the low level of social-security coverage 
of the self-employed professionals and, to a lesser extent, the employees of large firms 
(column (ii)).  
 
4. Wages and hours of work  
In this section we document relative wages and hours of work of different labor 
categories. We start by showing unconditional statistics and then turn to a multivariate 
regression analysis.  
Table 4.1 shows relative hours of work by social protection informality status and type 
of work. Workers are first divided into formal and informal according to the social 
protection situation, and then by type of work. The base group is all formal workers. 
Hours of work do not differ much across groups. Formal and informal entrepreneurs 
and formal salaried workers in private firms work in general more hours than the rest. 
Hours of work are significantly lower for family-based workers.  
The ranking of hourly wages is generally consistent across countries (table 4.2). The 
ranking is leaded by formal entrepreneurs and professionals, followed by the informal 
entrepreneurs and professionals and the formal salaried workers in the public sector and 
in large firms. On average, the formal professionals earn around 46% more than formal 
public sector employees, while formal employees in large firms earn 47% less than in 
the formal public sector.  
Formal workers in any labor category earn more than their informal counterparts in the 
same category. The difference ranges from 23% (for the self-employed professionals) to 
67% for the entrepreneurs. For salaried workers the formal-informal wage gap is around 
50%.  
To further analyze wage differentials across groups, we run regressions of the log of 
hourly wages against several controls and dummies for the informal status. The 
conditional measures of the earnings gap of being informal arising from these 
regressions should be interpreted with care.7 In particular, welfare comparisons drawn 
from these results may be misleading. An informal job differs from a formal one in 
many dimensions, not only in the paid hourly wage. If we find that hourly wages are the 
                                                 
7
 See Maloney (2004). 
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same in both sectors, the informal job may still be inferior since it precludes the access 
to social protection8, but it could be also superior, at least for some workers, since 
informality usually implies more flexibility: “being your own boss” is certainly a work 
amenity for many people. 
There is a second reason why regressions should be interpreted with care. Informality 
coefficients may be biased if there are unobserved worker’s characteristics that affect 
productivity and influence the sector an individual chooses to work in. It could be the 
case that only people with entrepreneurial ability choose to be informal, and then 
become successful showing higher wages. Or, in the other extreme, it could happen that 
only people with low work attachment and without ability to tolerate authority, 
responsibilities and punctuality choose to be informal, and then probably get low 
earnings, in part precisely because of their own characteristics. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of estimating log hourly wage regressions using Heckman 
maximum likelihood for a sample of urban workers aged 15 to 70. We run the 
regressions for men and women separately. In addition to the usual set of controls 
(education, age, and regional dummies) we include interactions between education and 
informality. In particular, we construct interaction variables by multiplying the informal 
binary variable with two educational dummies: one for those without any secondary 
education, and one for those with some high-school education. We also include 
interactions with dummy variables for the youth (15-24) and the elderly (56-70). The 
table shows the coefficients of these interaction variables.  
We restrict the analysis to salaried workers and divide them according to the social 
protection definition of informality. The results are conclusive: in nearly all countries 
salaried workers with social protection also earn substantially more than informal 
salaried workers, even when controlling for observable factors. On average, informal 
male workers without a secondary education earn 23% less than their formal 
counterparts. The wage gap for those with secondary education is also significant, and 
even bigger on average (27.5%). Wage gaps of roughly the same magnitude are also 
present in the case of female workers (26.5% and 33.3%, respectively). The coefficients 
of the interaction variables with age groups are not always significant. In some 
countries being informal is associated to higher wages for the youth and lower wages 
for the elderly. 
With the caveats discussed above, the results of this section provide preliminary 
evidence for the labor market segmentation hypothesis. Informal workers seem to be in 
an inferior situation compared to the formal counterparts: not only they lack social 
benefits related to the job, but they also earn lower wages, even when controlling for 
observable factors.  
 
                                                 
8
 Under the legalistic view, that is true by definition. Under the productive view, social protection is not 
precluded for informal workers but it is rarer. 
Labor informality - CEDLAS 
 20
5. The minimum wage and the lighthouse effect  
Compulsory minimum wages are aimed at improving incomes and reducing poverty, in 
particular among the unskilled workers. However, this regulation cannot typically be 
enforced in the informal sector of the economy, a fact that threatens its potential 
effectiveness. The effect of the minimum wage in the presence of a large informal 
sector has been typically studied using dualistic models (such as Harris and Todaro´s 
model). In these models the implementation of this regulation introduces a source of 
segmentation in the labor market, preventing the adjustment of nominal wages. Workers 
that are not able to obtain a job in the formal sector must resort to the flexible informal 
sector, in which wages can be adjusted as needed to absorb the excess labor supply. As 
a result of this process, employment increases and wages decline in the informal sector.    
Thus, in the presence of a large informal sector, the effect of a minimum wage law will 
depend on several factors such as the level of the minimum wage relative to the average 
wage, the dispersion in the wage distribution, the degree of enforcement of the 
regulation and the connection between the formal and the informal sectors, among 
others. The latter factor refers to the possibility of a lighthouse effect of the minimum 
wage over the informal sector: although in that sector the legislation on minimum wages 
does not operate, this regulation may still be used as a benchmark when setting wages. 
With the aim of providing evidence on the possible lighthouse effect of minimum 
wages, we present estimations of the density functions of the distribution of wages in 
the formal and informal sectors. The estimations were obtained using kernel techniques.  
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Figure 5.1 
Estimations of the density functions of the distribution of wages in the formal and 
informal sectors 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 5.1 (cont.) 
Estimations of the density functions of the distribution of wages in the formal and 
informal sectors 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
The results suggest that the minimum wage seems to be operative in the formal sector in 
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Venezuela, given the presence of a sharp leap in the 
density around the legislated value. In Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Peru, minimum wages look somewhat binding, although there is more dispersion 
around that value. In contrast, in Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay, most formal workers 
have wages far higher than the minimum wage. 
Results depicted in the figures seem to indicate that the lighthouse effect is significant 
in many Latin American countries. In particular, in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay either (i) the mode of the 
estimated wage distribution in the informal sector coincides with the minimum wage or 
(ii) there is a leap in the density function around this value, suggesting that the 
minimum wage works as a benchmark.  
The minimum wage is one of the main active labor policies that governments can use to 
modify the labor market outcomes. There is a heated debate on its optimality that, 
naturally, cannot be decided on one argument. But the results of this section are 
important in pointing out that one of the main criticisms to the minimum wage in 
developing economies with large informal sectors is probably flawed. Even when many 
firms are not obliged to pay the minimum wage,  the legislated value may be acting as a 
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lighthouse for the wage arrangements between firms and informal workers. These 
workers may end up benefiting from a policy measure that does not directly apply to 
them.  
 
6. Determinants I: the business cycle  
The aggregate level of labor informality in a country is the result of the interplay of 
numerous factors - including market forces, shocks, and policies - that are almost 
impossible to disentangle with the data typically at hand. In this section and the next we 
make a contribution to the debate on the determinants of informality by providing some 
evidence on the impact of two potential relevant drivers: the business cycle and the 
sectoral structure of the economy.   
In this section we start by evaluating the relationship between labor informality and the 
business cycle. In particular, we want to determine whether informal employment and 
relative wages across sectors move pro or anti-cyclically with the economy. It has been 
argued that the co-movements of these variables over the cycle can provide some 
preliminary evidence on the relevance of the dualistic view of informality.9 According 
to this hypothesis, when the economy enters a recession, sticky wages in the formal 
sector force firms to lay off some of their workers, who find in the informal sector a 
way of coping, while waiting for better times to come. Thus, the informal sector absorbs 
displaced workers during downturns. The entrance of workers into this sector drives 
wages down relative to those in the formal sector, which remains downwardly rigid. 
Therefore, relative (informal/formal) sector size and wages should move oppositely. 
In contrast, under other assumptions and shocks, the two variables may go in the same 
direction. For instance, if informality is perceived as a close substitute for a formal job, 
an autonomous increase of the informal sector relative wage (e.g. after an autonomous 
increase in the relative price of non-tradables) should attract workers and hence increase 
the size of that sector. On this framework, the informal status is perceived as a 
“voluntary” condition, because workers can choose to be formal or informal depending 
on the relative wages offered. Instead, in the segmented view the shifted workers from 
the formal sector cannot choose their status, which is associated with the “involuntary” 
notion of informality. 
We do not have enough data to carry out a rigorous test of the co-movements between 
the size of the informal sector, relative wages and the cycle.10 Instead, we present a 
                                                 
9
 See Fiess et al. (2002, 2006), Maloney (2004), Johnson et al. (1997), Schneider and Enste (2000), 
Friedman et al. (2000); Loayza, et al. (2005) and Loayza and Rigolini (2006). 
10
 Using multivariate co-integration techniques, Fiess et al. (2006) find periods of co-movements of 
relative earnings and sector size in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. They find that informal self-
employed and formal salaried sectors often appear as one integrated labor market, rather than segmented 
or dual labor markets. However, it is also the case that rigidities in the formal salaried sector can become 
binding, as appears to be most dramatically the case in Colombia, and lead to patterns consistent with the 
traditional segmentation hypothesis of adjustment. Loayza and Rigolini (2006) found a pro-cyclical 
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descriptive analysis of these variables for the countries in the sample. Figure 6.1 shows 
the ratio informal/formal for both the number of workers and the mean hourly wage, 
restricting the sample to urban workers aged 15 to 70 without tertiary education. While 
in that figure we restrict the analysis to salaried workers and implement a social 
protection definition of informality, we also extended the exercise alternatively 
considering as informal (i) the self-employed (non-entrepreneurs), and (ii) salaried 
workers without right to pensions plus the self employed (non-entrepreneurs).11  
The main finding is that in most countries the relative size of the informal sector seems 
to be counter-cyclical. In contrast, the evidence for cyclicality of relative wages is much 
less conclusive: it is difficult to find in most countries a clear pattern of the movements 
of relative wages over the business cycle. 
In Argentina, and according to the prediction of the labor-market-segmentation 
hypothesis, the share of informal workers greatly raised during the crisis that started 
around 1998, together with a decline in relative wages. But with the economic recovery 
since 2003, the relative wages did not increase as the hypothesis would predict. Brazil, 
Chile and Colombia seem to be consistent with the segmentation view when 
considering as informal the salaried workers without right to pensions, but this relation 
seems less clear when we also include the self-employed. The segmentation hypothesis 
seems to be consistent with the evidence in Uruguay and Venezuela, especially when 
including the self-employed, although not in the whole period under analysis. For other 
countries (e.g. Costa Rica and Peru), there is not a clear relationship even when looking 
at sub-periods of the sample. 
For an overall analysis, we run regressions for the ratio informal/formal of the number 
of workers (I/F) and mean hourly wages (Wi/Wf) as dependent variables, as lineal 
functions of the log per capita GDP. Alternatively, we use the three different definitions 
of informal workers mentioned above. Table 6.1 shows the relevant estimated 
coefficients. It is worth noticing, before interpreting these results, that coefficients 
should be taken only as correlations. The pool data regressions exploit the cross section 
variability which could be interpreted as a proxy of the long run relations: in nearly all 
cases, the level of production is negatively related with the ratio of workers, and it is 
positively related with relative wages, in both cases in a statistically significant way.  
To capture the short run associations, we run three different configurations: (i) adding 
fixed effects, (ii) adding fixed effects and lineal time trends by country, and (iii) adding 
fixed effects and second order polynomials time trends by country. We also compute 
the exercises replacing the log of per capita GDP by the business cycle computed using 
the Hodrick Prescott Filter (table 6.2). As an overall result, the ratio of informal/formal 
workers tend to be negatively related to per capita GDP and the business cycle, while 
                                                                                                                                               
movement in the relative size of self-employed workers in several of their sample of 42 countries, but 
because of the limited data, they do not analyze the relation of relative earnings. 
11
 For simplicity we do not show these graphs, which available upon request.  
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the ratio of wages usually shows a positive relation. As expected, this relations are 
much more evident in urban areas, and mostly significant for the unskilled workers 
group (up to secondary), but surprisingly also (and with high coefficients) for the skilled 
self-employed sample.  
Summarizing, the segmentation hypothesis seems to weakly prevail over the integration 
alternative. In general the relative size of the informal sector tends to diminish in the 
economic expansions and increase during downturns. The strong economic expansion 
that Latin America experienced during the 2000s could have been a relevant driving 
force of the fall in labor informality in the region.  
 
7. Determinants II: employment structure  
As previous sections have shown, informality rates vary considerably across countries 
and years. Beyond differences attributable to survey coverage, measurement errors and 
differences in surveys design, there is still enough heterogeneity to be explained. For 
instance, as table 7.1 shows, there are sectors (primary activities, construction, domestic 
servants) that appear to be essentially more informal than others, for any country. A 
natural question arises regarding whereas changes in informality rates in a country over 
time could result from a change in the employment structure, from a change in the 
intrinsic informality within sectors or a combination of both factors. Similarly, 
differences in informality rates across countries can be explained by an employment 
structure relatively intensive in sectors with high informality or can be the result of a 
higher propensity to informality within each sector. 
In this section we perform a set of exercises to account for the relative importance of the 
employment structure in explaining changes and differences in informality rates. In 
doing that, we use the social protection definition of labor informality.  
 
7.1.Characterizing differences between periods 
The first decomposition, reported in table 7.2, follows from the methodology proposed 
in Gasparini (2002). The main inputs are the estimated coefficients of models for the 
informality status of a worker. If we consider two periods, t1 and t2, the observed 
informality rate in t1 can be compared with two simulated aggregate rates; the 
informality rate that would arise if the distribution of characteristics (independent 
variables of the regression) of period t1 is combined with the regression parameters of 
period t2, and the informality rate that would arise if characteristics of period t2 are 
combined with t1 regression parameters. The first difference is labeled “parameter 
effect” and the second one “characteristics effect”.12  
                                                 
12
 A formal derivation of this procedure can be found in Gasparini (2002). 
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Following this procedure, we estimate the parameters effects and the characteristics 
effects of the observed changes in informality rates during of the 2000s. We also report 
decompositions of the changes during the 1990s for some countries with available data. 
The results can be interpreted as follows. Labor informality decreased 9.3 points among 
urban salaried workers in Argentina between 2003 and 2010. If only the parameters 
linking observable characteristics to informality had changed in that period, and all 
observable characteristics had remained fixed, informality would have fallen by 6.0 
points. On the other hand if only the observable characteristics of workers (including 
those of their jobs) had changed, informality would have decreased by 3.3 percentage 
points. Thus, the decline in labor informality in Argentina since 2003 is explained 
mainly by a decrease in the propensity to informality within most groups. However, the 
contribution of the change in the employment structure in some informality-decreasing 
directions was also significant.    
Similar results are found for the cases of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Peru and Uruguay, for the same period. In other words, the reduction in labor 
informality in these countries can be explained by both the characteristic effect and the 
parameter effect, being the latter the most relevant in magnitude.  
In the cases of Brazil, Nicaragua and Paraguay both effects also pushed in the direction 
of reducing informality, though the effect of the changes in parameters linking 
observable characteristics to informality was significantly lower than the effect of the 
changes in characteristics. In Chile, results indicate that the small decline in informality 
in the last decade is fully explained by the parameters effect.  
The reduction of labor informality in Colombia in the period 2006-2010 is explained in 
similar proportion by both effects. In Venezuela, the significant reduction in informality 
due to a change in the employment structure was partially cancelled by an increase in 
the propensity to informality within most sectors.  
Finally, in the cases of Bolivia, El Salvador and Mexico both effects operated in the 
same direction, though they pushed for an increase in the level of labor informality. In 
the three cases, the parameters effect was clearly higher than the characteristics effects. 
In summary, the contribution of the characteristic effect on the widespread fall in 
informality in the region in the 2000s has been far from negligible. Changes in the 
structure of the economy toward more “pro-formal” sectors (industry, public sector, 
some skilled services) seem to have contributed to the reduction in the national rates of 
labor informality. In most countries the contribution was significant, although in many 
of them it was just complementary of a stronger economy-wide movement toward more 
formal labor arrangements.  
 
7.2. Characterizing differences across countries 
The observed difference in the informality across countries can be decomposed into 
changes in the characteristics of the population and changes in the estimated coefficients 
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of the informality regression. Following the same procedure as in the previous section,  
we estimate the parameters effects and the characteristics effects of the observed 
differences in informality rates among countries (table 7.3).  
We find that while the employment structure in Uruguay -in terms of sector 
composition and characteristics of its labor force- is the most pro-formal in the region, 
Chile has the most pro-formal vector of parameters. That implies that any country with 
Chile’s parameters and with Uruguay’s vector of characteristics would reduce its level 
of labor informality. Countries with high rates of informality (Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru) have typically pro-informal employment 
structures. Informality in those countries would be reduced if they had the 
characteristics of other countries. 
An interesting finding is that the size of the parameters effect tends to be greater than 
the characteristics effect in countries with high informality, while the opposite is true 
for countries with low levels of informality.  
Note that this decomposition imposes the joint distribution of population characteristics 
of one country over another; this means that the correlation between two particular 
dimensions (i.e. education and sector structure) is fixed. Consequently, the 
“characteristics effect” can be an imperfect indicator if we want to evaluate how a 
particular dimension can explain the differences across countries without changing other 
variables. In particular, we are interested in isolating the effect of the employment 
structure; in other words, we want to estimate how the overall informality rate would 
change in a particular country if a different sector structure were imposed, keeping 
unchanged the internal characteristics within sectors (i.e. parameters, education, age, 
etc.).  
A simple exercise can be performed to estimate how a country overall informality rate 
would change if the sector-structure from a different country were imposed. Following 
Reis et al. (2009), given two countries A and B, we can express the simulated 
informality rate for country A using country B’s sector-structure as:  
 
 
 
where ( )Bsθ   is the share of sector s in total employment of country B and ( )Asi  is the 
informality rate within sector s in country A. The difference between observed rates and 
simulated ones accounts for the “composition effect”. 
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structure of the country in the corresponding row.13 We find that Costa Rica, Argentina 
and Mexico are the countries where the structure of employment is more pro-formal, in 
the sense that imposing the employment structure of any other country would increase 
informality rates. On the other hand, countries like Ecuador, Chile and Paraguay would 
reduce informality rates if workers were distributed according to the sectoral structure 
of any other country. For instance, Chilean workers are relatively more concentrated on 
two sectors with the highest informality within Chilean economy (primary activities and 
commerce). Consequently, if we combine Chilean sector-informality rates with the 
employment structure from Argentina (where these sectors represent lower shares on 
total employment), informality would decrease. Although the composition effect 
appears to be important when comparing some countries, in most cases it only accounts 
for a small portion of the difference. Consider for example the effect of combining 
Chilean employment-structure with the Argentinean sector-informality rates. The 
composition effect would be 0.5 percentage points whereas the actual difference in 
informality rates between these countries is around 14 percentage points.  
 
8. Concluding remarks  
Labor informality is a pervasive characteristic of the labor markets in Latin America, 
and a central issue in the public policy debate. In this paper we discuss the concept of 
labor informality and implement alternative definitions using microdata from a large 
database of national household surveys in all Latin American countries.  
Changes in labor informality have been heterogeneous across countries. However, a 
clear picture of different patterns in the two decades covered in the study emerges: 
while in the 1990s labor informality did not change or even increased in some 
economies, in the 2000s most countries managed to reduce the share of the unprotected 
workers. These results apply to all definitions of informality.  
In general the relative size of the informal sector tends to diminish in the economic 
expansions and increase during downturns. The strong economic expansion that Latin 
America experienced during the 2000s could have been a relevant driving force of the 
fall in labor informality in the region. Also, changes in the structure of the economy 
toward more “pro-formal” sectors (industry, public sector, some skilled services) seem 
to have contributed to the reduction in the national rates of labor informality. In most 
countries the contribution was significant, although in many of them it was just 
complementary of a stronger economy-wide movement toward more formal labor 
arrangements.  
With the caveats discussed in the paper, we find some weak evidence for the labor 
market segmentation hypothesis: informal workers lack social benefits and earn lower 
wages, and informality is in general counter-cyclical.  
                                                 
13
 Using a similar procedure, Reis et al. (2009) estimate how the informality rate in Turkey would change 
if the structure of a more developed country were used. Particularly, Reis et al. (2009) imposes the 
average European sector-structure. 
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Appendix 1 
Social protection definition of informality  
Country A work is formal is he/she…
Argentina has a deduction in his/her salary for pension contribution
Bolivia is affiliated with an AFP (Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones)
Brazil contributes to the Social Security system
Chile is affiliated with any social security system
Colombia is affiliated with any social security system
Costa Rica is affiliated with CCSS (Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social)
Dominican Rep. is affiliated with AFP o other pension system
Ecuador has social security from his/her employment
El Salvador is affiliated with any social security system 
Honduras has the right to a pension when retired
Mexico has the right to a pension when retired (is affiliated with SAR (Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro) o AFORE (Administradora de Fondo de Retiro))
Nicaragua contributes to the INSS (Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social)
Paraguay contributes to any social security system
Peru is affiliated with any social security system
Uruguay has a deduction in his/her salary for pension contribution
Venezuela has the right to social benefits
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Table 3.1 
Household surveys used for this study  
Country Survey Name Acronym Years Coverage
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1992-2003 Urban 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares - Continua EPH-C 2003-2010 Urban 
Bolivia Encuesta Continua de Hogares - MECOVI ECH 1999-2008 National
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1992-2009 National
Chile Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1990-2009 National
Colombia Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2001-2005 National
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH 2006-2010 National
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1989-2009 National
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENH 2010 National
Dominican Rep. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2000-2010 National
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo, Desemple y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003-2010 National
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1991-2010 National
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 1991-2010 National
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1992-2010 National
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 1993-2005 National
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1989-2010 National
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997/2001 National
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1999/2003-2010 National
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997-2010 National
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1989-2005 Urban
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2006-2010 National
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1989-2010 National
 
Table 3.2 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
Salaried workers 
Costa Dominican
Year Argentina Bolivia Brasil Chile Colombia Rica Republic Ecuador El Salvador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1989 27.2
1990 21.4 31.1
1991 60.2
1992 31.8 38.0 22.8 30.0
1993 32.5 39.1 29.3 62.3
1994 29.7 32.1
1995 33.8 38.5 31.4 54.7 34.6
1996 35.9 39.3 22.0 32.9 57.0 35.0
1997 37.0 38.2 34.0 75.3 37.5
1998 37.9 36.6 22.9 34.1 48.5 57.8 71.5 35.4
1999 38.3 64.2 37.0 33.9 47.8 73.8 75.9 35.6
2000 38.5 66.3 23.7 34.1 47.0 54.8 76.0 31.9
2001 38.7 70.4 36.1 31.0 48.0 68.2 72.6 72.0 23.9 35.6
2002 44.1 74.4 36.3 30.7 45.4 58.8 73.8 70.7 24.4 38.9
2003 43.7 75.3 35.0 22.4 32.0 67.6 48.2 74.4 69.0 26.7 41.6
2004 43.4 75.3 35.0 29.4 67.1 50.3 60.1 76.8 62.1 28.4 40.2
2005 42.1 67.3 33.7 32.5 53.7 67.3 48.2 61.1 66.6 71.7 64.4 27.1 40.0
2006 39.9 66.3 33.2 20.2 51.0 31.2 46.4 67.2 49.3 59.5 75.6 61.6 22.7 39.5
2007 39.5 68.2 31.1 48.0 30.8 36.2 66.4 48.6 70.7 57.7 22.1 37.4
2008 37.1 70.0 29.8 43.6 28.5 28.9 64.3 46.2 61.0 70.4 57.1 20.8 34.3
2009 35.9 28.9 22.0 44.5 27.5 28.5 60.3 48.5 68.3 54.6 19.5
2010 34.6 44.3 29.4 25.4 55.0 50.5 63.2 63.0 54.4 19.0 29.2
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Table 3.3 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
All workers 
Costa
Year Bolivia Brazil Colombia Rica El Salvador Nicaragua Peru
1989 38.4
1990 48.1
1991 . 75.2
1992 57.4 46.9
1993 57.9 46.8 79.1
1994 48.3
1995 57.5 48.3 71.9
1996 57.1 49.1 72.2
1997 57.0 50.8
1998 56.5 50.2 65.8 84.5
1999 88.7 57.3 50.7 65.3 87.2
2000 88.8 50.1 67.0 87.3
2001 89.6 55.0 49.9 66.6 83.7 87.0
2002 91.3 55.6 50.0 66.5 86.9
2003 90.6 54.4 50.0 66.5 85.6
2004 90.6 53.5 49.0 67.7 80.8
2005 80.7 52.6 49.6 67.3 83.6 81.1
2006 82.2 51.4 70.2 49.2 66.2 79.0
2007 88.2 49.3 68.5 46.8 66.4 75.8
2008 88.2 47.9 67.8 45.5 65.8 75.4
2009 46.5 69.5 44.9 67.6 73.5
2010 69.7 44.5 68.5 72.9
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Table 3.4 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
All workers – all self-employed considered as informal 
 
Costa Dominican
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Rica Republic Ecuador El Salvador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1989 46.0
1990 40.6 48.7
1991 76.7
1992 48.5 62.4 41.0 46.7
1993 49.6 62.9 46.1 62.3
1994 46.7 47.3
1995 48.9 62.8 47.6 73.6 56.8
1996 49.9 62.2 38.8 48.0 75.2 57.2
1997 50.3 61.8 49.7 87.9 60.0
1998 50.6 60.8 39.1 48.7 69.7 72.3 71.5 . 59.3
1999 51.0 88.9 61.6 48.4 68.2 87.1 89.8 59.9
2000 51.4 89.2 39.8 50.0 69.2 68.6 . 90.2 58.8
2001 52.1 90.3 58.7 47.9 70.3 68.2 86.8 88.1 43.8 60.8
2002 55.9 91.8 58.9 47.9 69.1 71.8 88.2 87.6 45.1 64.0
2003 56.5 91.0 58.0 39.2 47.5 81.6 69.3 88.1 88.0 46.8 66.5
2004 55.5 91.0 56.9 46.3 82.5 69.7 70.7 89.5 89.8 48.0 64.7
2005 54.1 89.5 56.1 47.0 75.3 81.6 70.4 71.9 66.6 86.0 84.5 45.9 63.4
2006 51.5 89.1 55.0 36.7 71.4 46.5 71.3 81.9 69.3 71.4 88.1 82.7 42.0 62.2
2007 49.9 87.7 52.9 70.0 44.7 65.4 81.1 69.5 85.0 80.4 41.6 61.1
2008 48.2 88.4 50.9 69.9 42.8 62.9 79.1 70.0 68.7 84.1 80.1 40.2 59.2
2009 47.5 49.9 37.7 71.8 42.2 62.9 77.6 72.4 83.5 78.7 39.1
2010 45.5 72.1 43.8 62.1 74.1 71.6 70.2 81.1 78.5 38.2 56.9
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
  
Table 3.5 
Distribution of Workers by Labor Category 
Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Workers with 
Country Year Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled zero income
Argentina 2010 4.6 37.3 16.4 3.3 22.5 15.1 0.8
Bolivia 2008 5.8 15.7 8.4 1.6 10.3 31.6 26.6
Brazil 2009 4.3 32.7 11.7 1.5 21.9 19.0 8.8
Chile 2009 3.5 46.5 13.0 2.6 14.0 19.9 0.5
Colombia 2010 5.0 25.4 4.5 3.2 16.9 39.8 5.2
Costa Rica 2009 7.3 38.5 15.8 0.3 18.0 18.4 1.6
Dominican Rep. 2010 4.8 27.2 12.2 2.4 11.4 40.2 1.7
Ecuador 2010 3.4 25.2 9.3 1.7 20.2 29.4 10.8
El Salvador 2010 4.1 28.6 7.6 0.7 19.3 29.2 10.6
Honduras 2010 2.3 18.5 6.1 0.5 21.1 39.2 12.4
Mexico 2010 5.1 33.7 11.5 1.1 26.2 16.4 6.1
Nicaragua 2005 4.5 23.5 6.6 0.7 18.3 29.6 16.8
Panama 2010 3.1 36.0 14.6 1.0 13.2 25.9 6.2
Paraguay 2010 5.1 19.6 9.0 1.1 . 22.2 32.8 10.2
Peru 2010 5.5 19.8 8.3 3.2 14.4 33.4 15.4
Uruguay 2010 4.8 39.1 14.3 1.8 18.0 20.8 1.3
Venezuela 2008 4.5 29.0 16.6 2.3 12.6 33.4 1.6
Formal Informal
Salaried workers
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
Table 3.6 
Distribution of Workers by Labor Category - Urban Areas 
Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Workers with 
Country Year Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled zero income
Argentina 2010 4.6 37.3 16.4 3.3 22.5 15.1 0.8
Bolivia 2008 6.4 23.4 11.6 2.7 14.6 30.8 10.5
Brazil 2009 4.7 37.6 13.0 1.7 21.3 17.8 3.7
Chile 2009 3.5 47.2 13.8 2.8 13.3 18.9 0.4
Colombia 2010 4.7 29.5 5.0 4.0 15.2 37.7 3.9
Costa Rica 2009 7.6 39.9 18.4 2.2 15.8 14.9 1.1
Dominican Rep. 2010 4.3 30.3 14.8 3.1 10.7 34.4 2.3
Ecuador 2010 4.2 29.7 12.1 2.5 19.2 27.1 5.3
El Salvador 2010 4.4 34.1 10.0 1.0 16.4 27.3 6.9
Honduras 2010 9.8 27.8 10.3 1.0 17.8 25.7 7.7
Mexico 2010 8.0 36.8 12.6 1.1 27.2 10.7 3.7
Nicaragua 2005 5.4 30.4 9.2 1.2 18.8 26.7 8.3
Panama 2010 3.5 44.8 19.2 1.3 11.8 18.4 1.1
Paraguay 2010 6.3 27.1 13.5 1.9 25.3 22.6 3.5
Peru 2010 6.2 26.1 10.9 4.8 16.5 28.9 6.7
Uruguay 2010 4.5 40.1 14.9 1.9 17.4 20.1 1.1
Venezuela 2008 4.0 29.3 17.9 2.4 10.9 33.8 1.7
Formal
Salaried workers
Informal
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Table 3.7 
Informality Rate 
Productive definition 
Costa Dominican
Year Argentina Bolivia Brasil Chile Colombia Rica Republic Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1989 44.7 50.8 49.2 39.5
1990 42.9 42.7
1991 54.8 58.5 45.8
1992 50.2 59.0 39.0 41.3 56.9 51.6 37.2
1993 46.6 58.7 41.7 55.4 65.6
1994 46.1 42.1 57.0
1995 43.5 59.5 42.5 59.0 44.8 37.7 45.3
1996 44.8 58.4 38.0 42.3 59.3 38.8
1997 43.0 58.5 43.5 59.2 44.6 70.8 64.8 39.0
1998 42.8 57.8 38.3 42.4 56.0 58.7 52.6 65.7 44.7 65.2 37.7 47.1
1999 43.2 76.5 58.8 42.9 53.9 60.3 68.6 65.3 49.6
2000 44.2 75.3 36.9 44.0 51.7 54.9 49.4 65.4 38.7 50.5
2001 44.6 75.7 56.2 41.8 52.1 57.7 61.7 64.7 48.6 70.5 65.3 44.4 48.1
2002 43.0 75.2 55.9 42.5 53.1 56.9 64.7 53.9 50.2 73.8 64.7 45.6 51.9
2003 43.6 73.4 55.7 37.0 40.3 51.6 62.0 55.2 63.6 50.2 72.5 67.1 46.5 54.0
2004 42.9 73.4 54.2 39.5 51.1 62.5 55.2 58.3 50.2 48.0 73.5 67.1 45.2 51.1
2005 41.8 70.7 53.9 40.4 53.1 61.9 59.0 61.7 49.2 64.7 49.0 70.7 66.2 44.4 48.6
2006 41.2 71.1 52.5 35.2 59.7 39.2 53.9 62.4 56.8 58.8 52.8 48.4 71.1 65.5 43.5 47.6
2007 41.0 69.0 51.5 59.0 38.0 52.4 60.9 56.1 58.4 68.4 63.8 42.1 46.7
2008 39.7 68.6 49.4 60.2 36.9 53.5 60.2 56.7 44.5 67.2 63.8 40.8 46.4
2009 40.7 49.8 34.4 61.9 36.7 53.3 61.8 59.0 62.9 45.4 68.2 63.2 40.4
2010 38.4 62.1 38.9 54.1 60.4 58.0 44.5 43.8 65.1 63.0 40.1 46.4
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 Table 3.8 
Informality Rate (Social Protection) by Labor Category 
Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Workers with 
Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled zero income
Argentina 2010 21.7 11.1 72.2
Bolivia 2008 93.9 71.4 26.0 92.9 97.3 98.6 99.5
Brazil 2009 41.3 14.2 7.0 56.6 62.6 85.1 96.0
Chile 2009 43.5 16.5 12.6 52.0 51.2 80.2 88.2
Colombia 2010 84.4 23.6 2.3 57.9 86.9 94.4 99.1
Costa Rica 2009 81.2 19.0 1.9 94.0 74.2 94.1 96.1
Dominican Rep. 2010 20.8 8.6 91.6
Ecuador 2010 44.2 10.8 88.6
El Salvador 2010 87.6 39.9 5.6 67.8 94.5 98.7 99.6
Honduras 2010
Mexico 2010 49.9 37.3 91.7
Nicaragua 2005 97.3 54.3 23.5 99.2 97.9 99.8 100.0
Paraguay 2010 60.9 19.2 93.7
Peru 2010 73.7 46.4 19.9 57.7 85.8 87.6 96.4
Uruguay 2010 10.7 0.0 53.4
Venezuela 2008 28.7 13.1 83.9
Salaried workers
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
Table 3.9 
Informality Rate (Social Protection) by Labor Category 
Formal Legal Informal Legal Formal Legal Informal Legal
Sample (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) + (iv)
Argentina Only Salaried Workers 57.5 13.0 8.1 21.3 78.8
Bolivia Only Salaried Workers 31.1 38.9 0.8 29.3 60.3
All Workers 11.1 20.2 0.9 67.8 78.9
Brazil Only Salaried Workers 58.7 8.2 12.4 20.7 79.4
All Workers 42.1 8.1 11.4 38.4 80.5
Chile Only Salaried Workers 68.4 12.7 9.2 9.6 78.1
All Workers 53.7 12.2 10.7 23.4 77.0
Colombia Only Salaried Workers 51.0 13.3 4.7 31.0 82.0
All Workers 25.8 12.1 4.5 57.6 83.5
Costa Rica Only Salaried Workers 64.0 10.8 6.5 18.7 82.7
All Workers 49.2 11.9 6.1 32.8 82.0
Dom. Rep. Only Salaried Workers 73.7 14.9 1.0 10.5 84.1
Ecuador Only Salaried Workers 40.8 22.2 4.2 32.8 73.6
El Salvador Only Salaried Workers 47.9 23.4 1.6 27.1 75.0
All Workers 26.9 16.8 1.3 55.0 81.9
Honduras Only Salaried Workers
Mexico Only Salaried Workers 33.2 29.2 3.1 34.5 67.7
Nicaragua Only Salaried Workers 32.6 29.6 0.8 37.0 69.6
All Workers 15.9 19.4 0.5 64.2 80.1
Paraguay Only Salaried Workers 34.6 31.7 2.1 31.6 66.2
Peru Only Salaried Workers 40.3 25.5 4.9 29.3 69.7
All Workers 20.0 17.0 6.8 56.2 76.2
Uruguay Only Salaried Workers 69.0 5.8 12.0 13.2 82.2
Venezuela Only Salaried Workers 62.7 18.5 3.0 15.8 78.5
Formal Productive Informal Productive
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Table 4.1 
Relative hours of work by type of work 
Formal Workers = 100 
Social Protection Definition 
Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Zero Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Zero
Country Year Total Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled Income Total Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled Income
Argentina 2010 84 100 74 77 100 106 85 103 .
Bolivia 2008 97 114 106 93 100 112 107 71 100 100 112 89 89 118 118 104
Brazil 2009 83 108 93 78 84 87 88 56 100 112 103 87 95 104 107 85
Chile 2009 90 104 91 91 89 84 91 88 100 107 100 98 89 99 101 111
Colombia 2010 87 105 95 105 77 93 86 60 100 110 101 93 85 108 99 78
Costa Rica 2009 80 102 91 61 72 74 80 54 100 105 103 94 95 98 91 42
Dominican Rep. 2010 99 102 82 100 100 105 90 109
Ecuador 2010 94 96 91 93 100 105 92 100
El Salvador 2010 87 99 98 96 94 89 84 73 100 104 104 91 89 104 85 50
Honduras 2010
Mexico 2010 90 99 99 90 82 90 81 72 100 124 105 87 102 108
Nicaragua 2005 87 100 100 91 95 97 84 66 100 119 104 91 105 100 101
Paraguay 2010 105 . 107 81 . 107 100 109 87 120
Peru 2010 86 100 98 91 84 95 80 75 100 107 111 93 77 92 91 88
Uruguay 2010 78 90 73 100 105 91 . 96
Venezuela 2008 96 99 84 96 100 103 95 105
Salaried workers Salaried workers
Formal workersInformal Workers
  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Table 4.2 
Relative wages by type of work 
Formal Workers = 100 
Social Protection Definition 
Self-employed Salaried Self-employed Self-employed Salaried Self-employed
Country Year Total Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled Total Entrepreneurs Large firms Public sector professionals Small firms Unskilled
Argentina 2010 56 64 71 51 100 96 123 70
Bolivia 2008 50 80 48 69 82 37 45 100 169 99 105 50 90 39
Brazil 2009 56 169 61 105 167 34 53 100 284 81 135 270 53 100
Chile 2009 98 386 64 90 337 44 103 100 424 85 117 425 55 125
Colombia 2010 40 85 41 72 106 34 34 100 216 88 165 184 53 59
Costa Rica 2009 80 188 68 105 179 48 90 100 208 81 160 231 59 66
Dominican Rep. 2010 60 56 106 53 100 93 114 72
Ecuador 2010 53 59 82 48 100 85 135 63
El Salvador 2010 57 129 51 67 127 43 59 100 249 77 148 169 65 103
Honduras 2010
Mexico 2010 61 87 65 103 164 45 47 100 365 86 146 75 154
Nicaragua 2005 64 233 60 83 134 43 51 100 388 95 105 60 87 57
Paraguay 2010 60 65 105 49 100 87 120 75
Peru 2010 57 128 61 62 87 42 50 100 176 100 105 126 65 74
Uruguay 2010 56 68 51 100 96 130 65
Venezuela 2008 66 75 67 58 100 93 113 65
Informal Workers Formal workers
Salaried workers Salaried workers
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
  
Table 4.3 
Hourly Wage Regressions 
Social Protection Definition 
Country Year Primary Secondary Young Old Primary Secondary Young Old
Argentina 2010 -0.409*** -0.429*** 0.051** -0.098*** -0.226*** -0.422*** 0.024 -0.142***
Bolivia 2007 -0.237*** -0.308*** -0.054 -0.109 -0.375*** -0.555*** 0.061 -0.241
Brazil 2009 -0.324*** -0.267*** 0.070*** -0.137*** -0.247*** -0.335*** -0.046*** -0.055**
Chile 2009 -0.110*** -0.138*** -0.048* -0.074** -0.085*** -0.187*** -0.039 -0.019
Colombia 2010 -0.392*** -0.450*** 0.037** -0.221*** -0.415*** -0.468*** 0.016 -0.092***
Costa Rica 2010 -0.160*** -0.354*** 0.039 -0.133 -0.348*** -0.410*** 0.144* 0.012
Dom. Rep. 2010 -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.078 0.108 -0.066 -0.316*** 0.049 0.177
Ecuador 2010 -0.171*** -0.242*** -0.007 -0.066 -0.284*** -0.282*** -0.040 -0.383***
El Salvador 2010 -0.275*** -0.384*** 0.032 -0.153*** -0.300*** -0.429*** 0.069** -0.204***
Mexico 2010 -0.171*** -0.241*** 0.030 0.024 -0.103*** -0.286*** 0.045 0.034
Nicaragua 2005 -0.094** -0.215*** 0.017 -0.064 -0.276*** -0.203*** 0.047 -0.299**
Paraguay 2010 -0.272*** -0.232*** -0.065 0.180 -0.398*** -0.204*** -0.048 0.140
Peru 2010 -0.188*** -0.195*** 0.003 -0.031 -0.408*** -0.303*** -0.035 0.061
Uruguay 2010 -0.339*** -0.392*** 0.166*** -0.155*** -0.145*** -0.340*** 0.111*** -0.240***
Venezuela 2010 -0.155*** -0.148*** 0.005 -0.012 -0.304*** -0.262*** -0.047* -0.114***
Males Females
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Coefficients for natural log of per capita GDP 
swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se
-3.486 -4.543 -8.254 -2.006 -1.917 -4.043 -0.277 -0.061 -0.342 -7.934 -31.116 -41.762 -4.788 -14.410 -21.096
(6.34)** (5.57)** (6.11)** (6.30)** (5.71)** (6.22)** (5.89)** (3.08)** (5.68)** (5.07)** (3.85)** (4.25)** (5.94)** (4.65)** (4.89)**
-1.248 -3.259 -4.511 -0.482 -0.757 -1.251 -0.172 -0.075 -0.252 -4.485 -7.593 -10.946 -4.014 -10.156 -11.846
 (1.23)  (1.82)  (1.61)  (1.63) (2.95)** (2.30)* (2.07)* (2.48)* (2.38)*  (1.52)  (1.11)  (1.16) (2.19)* (2.90)** (2.12)*
0.215 1.521 1.383 -1.507 -1.218 -2.845 -0.189 -0.150 -0.365 -5.610 -28.129 -28.787 -0.899 -6.433 -2.172
 (0.19)  (0.97)  (0.54) (3.45)** (3.89)** (3.87)** (2.26)* (3.31)** (3.56)**  (0.74)  (1.20)  (0.94)  (0.31)  (1.34)  (0.25)
-0.539 0.395 -0.095 -0.949 -0.769 -1.738 -0.131 -0.177 -0.311 2.655 -0.662 12.944 1.125 -1.943 9.681
 (0.65)  (0.42)  (0.06) (2.62)** (4.44)** (3.74)**  (1.59) (2.94)** (2.74)**  (0.42)  (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.43)  (0.58)  (0.87)
swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se
0.086 0.242 0.168 0.067 0.245 0.166 0.001 0.300 0.196 -0.041 0.310 0.195 -0.004 0.327 0.204
(3.70)** (3.38)** (3.73)** (3.49)** (3.64)** (4.01)**  (0.05) (4.45)** (4.74)**  (0.62) (4.14)** (4.21)**  (0.08) (4.31)** (4.36)**
0.145 -0.064 0.029 0.111 0.041 0.063 -0.125 0.121 -0.016 0.110 -0.008 0.044 0.144 0.124 0.127
(2.13)*  (0.72)  (0.41) (2.42)*  (0.66)  (1.19)  (1.96)  (0.83)  (0.19)  (0.87)  (0.08)  (0.57)  (1.65)  (1.47) (2.10)*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.57) (0.66) (1.68) (0.27) (0.46) (0.96) (0.61) (1.42) (40.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.348 0.357 0.287 0.282 0.374 0.313 0.054 0.835 0.521 -0.044 -0.045 -0.281 0.068 0.060 -0.091
(2.32)*  (1.52)  (1.76) (3.08)** (2.41)* (2.90)**  (0.29) (3.06)** (3.01)**  (0.24)  (0.10)  (0.77)  (0.63)  (0.22)  (0.42)
Dep. Var: ratio informal/formal Urban up to primary school Urban up to secondary school Urban only tertiary school Rural up to primary school Rural up to secondary school
pool regression
fixed effects
fixed effects plus lineal trend by country
fixed effects plus lineal & cuadratic trend by country
Rural up to primary school Rural up to secondary school
pool regression
fixed effects
Dep. Var: ratio of wage informal / wage formal Urban up to primary school Urban up to secondary school Urban only tertiary school
fixed effects plus lineal trend by country
fixed effects plus lineal & cuadratic trend by country
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Note: swrp = salaried workers without right to pensions, se = self employed 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.2 
Coefficients for HP business cycle  
swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se
-2.297 -2.449 -4.933 -2.452 -2.027 -4.555 -0.364 -0.190 -0.581 -10.998 -25.362 -31.579 -6.619 -17.697 -14.827
 (1.56)  (1.30)  (1.55) (3.60)** (3.97)** (4.00)** (2.39)* (2.87)** (3.30)**  (1.63)  (1.26)  (1.25)  (1.54) (2.31)*  (1.03)
0.533 1.881 1.985 -1.560 -1.343 -3.056 -0.144 -0.160 -0.332 -6.461 -31.346 -29.314 -0.897 -7.772 0.555
 (0.37)  (0.95)  (0.61) (2.87)** (3.41)** (3.20)**  (1.43) (2.60)* (2.62)**  (0.74)  (1.16)  (0.81)  (0.26)  (1.30)  (0.05)
-0.412 0.666 0.317 -0.977 -0.829 -1.829 -0.117 -0.201 -0.323 2.578 0.469 15.814 1.202 -1.288 12.211
 (0.42)  (0.57)  (0.16) (2.35)* (4.13)** (3.37)**  (1.27) (2.82)** (2.44)*  (0.37)  (0.03)  (0.60)  (0.42)  (0.36)  (0.94)
swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se swrp se swrp+se
0.506 0.721 0.606 0.381 0.633 0.559 0.151 1.074 0.754 -0.021 -0.030 -0.083 0.066 0.015 -0.013
(2.50)* (2.72)** (2.93)** (3.29)** (3.47)** (3.92)**  (0.76) (3.61)** (3.59)**  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.31)  (0.47)  (0.05)  (0.06)
0.315 0.476 0.340 0.243 0.449 0.337 0.021 0.984 0.596 0.517 0.258 0.110 0.315 0.089 0.005
 (1.85)  (1.84)  (1.85) (2.55)* (2.58)* (2.82)**  (0.10) (2.97)** (2.93)**  (1.88)  (0.61)  (0.32)  (1.90)  (0.32)  (0.02)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.57) (0.66) (1.68) (0.27) (0.46) (0.96) (0.61) (1.42) (40.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dep. Var: ratio informal/formal Urban up to primary school Urban up to secondary school Urban only tertiary school Rural up to primary school Rural up to secondary school
fixed effects
fixed effects plus lineal trend by country
fixed effects plus lineal & cuadratic trend by country
Dep. Var: ratio of wage informal / wage formal Rural up to secondary school
fixed effects
fixed effects plus lineal trend by country
fixed effects plus lineal & cuadratic trend by country
Urban up to primary school Urban up to secondary school Urban only tertiary school Rural up to primary school
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
Note: swrp = salaried workers without right to pensions, se = self employed 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 7.1 
Country
Primary activities Industry low tech Industry high tech Construction Commerce Utilities & transportation Skilled services
Public 
administration
Education & 
Health
Domestic 
servants
Argentina 30.1 42.5 18.9 64.4 40.3 32.2 23.7 11.0 19.9 82.8
Bolivia 84.9 72.6 - 91.7 81.9 77.2 66.4 31.7 35.7 98.6
Brazil 59.5 20.8 12.8 42.4 27.3 15.8 15.2 9.8 15.3 68.7
Chile 29.2 17.8 14.5 21.3 23.3 16.7 13.6 12.3 15.3 57.3
Colombia 76.9 36.8 24.5 67.3 53.0 29.9 15.1 7.1 20.4 88.4
Costa Rica 39.6 21.0 18.6 46.2 31.0 22.5 15.7 4.0 12.7 81.5
Dominican Rep. 42.7 15.3 33.3 26.2 44.0 22.3 21.8 7.1 25.2 -
Ecuador 83.5 52.4 42.6 88.5 54.8 50.8 29.3 9.7 26.7 80.5
El Salvador 67.8 32.8 41.7 57.8 19.2 58.9 34.8 - 13.0 -
Guatemala 87.4 45.9 45.4 87.0 56.0 65.7 33.6 27.0 39.8 96.3
Mexico 89.3 57.9 34.3 84.5 65.1 59.9 47.7 44.4 39.1 99.0
Nicaragua 94.5 35.7 65.2 80.3 70.0 70.4 45.1 30.1 34.6 99.1
Paraguay 96.0 68.8 66.4 96.1 75.4 51.7 56.5 23.4 38.0 99.8
Peru 77.6 51.1 50.9 65.2 63.2 56.5 30.5 27.8 27.5 92.1
Uruguay 29.1 19.0 16.2 23.4 21.5 9.9 11.1 1.3 7.8 55.4
Venezuela 68.1 34.8 31.1 57.5 45.2 45.0 23.7 10.4 31.2 82.0
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Table 7.2 
Decomposition of changes in informality rates 
Urban salaried workers 
Social Protection Definition 
Characteristics Parameters
Argentina
1992-2003 12.5 1.5 11.0
2003-2010 -9.3 -3.3 -6.0 
Bolivia
2000-2008 5.1 1.1 4.0
Brasil
1993-2001 -0.1 -2.0 1.9
2001-2009 -6.7 -4.4 -2.3 
Chile
1990-2000 3.4 -3.6 7.0
2000-2009 -0.2 -0.7 0.5
Colombia
2006-2010 -5.6 -2.7 -2.9 
Costa Rica
1990-2000 5.7 2.3 3.4
2000-2010 -2.4 -0.1 -2.4 
Dominican Rep.
2005-2010 -32.6 -3.3 -29.3 
Ecuador
2003-2010 -14.1 -5.0 -9.1 
El Salvador
1991-2000 -4.2 -7.2 3.0
2000-2010 4.7 0.7 4.0
Mexico
1990-2010 10.9 2.5 8.3
Nicaragua
1998-2005 -5.9 -5.6 -0.3 
Paraguay
2001-2010 -5.6 -3.8 -1.8 
Peru
2000-2010 -25.7 -3.2 -22.5 
Uruguay
2001-2010 -4.2 -0.3 -3.9 
Venezuela
2000-2010 -3.0 -8.3 5.2
Actual change
Effects [1]
 
[1] Average effects 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Table 7.3 
Decomposition of informality rates 
Social Protection definition 
 
Simulated rates
            Parameters of …
Arg Bra Chi Cos Ecu Els Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Characteristics of …
Arg 35.5 27.5 29.1 31.2 49.9 41.7 53.9 53.5 59.2 51.8 21.1 40.3
Bra 36.7 26.0 28.1 28.5 50.4 42.5 54.9 54.2 61.6 56.5 21.2 40.3
Chi 27.5 18.1 20.8 21.6 41.6 29.0 46.7 45.6 55.8 42.9 12.7 29.8
Cos 30.6 21.0 24.0 23.5 45.1 33.7 48.4 46.6 55.4 50.0 16.3 35.1
Ecu 36.4 25.8 27.3 29.4 51.9 40.1 54.9 54.5 62.0 53.1 21.1 40.7
Els* 28.5 18.9 23.8 22.0 47.3 42.3 51.6 49.6 58.6 50.2 17.0 38.8
Mex 38.9 28.4 29.8 30.7 55.6 43.6 55.4 56.9 64.6 57.7 22.9 43.5
Nic 40.8 28.5 29.8 30.2 57.2 45.6 58.8 57.1 67.2 61.8 24.2 44.6
Par** 43.6 33.1 33.4 34.7 57.9 50.2 61.2 61.8 63.9 62.5 26.4 47.5
Per 34.1 25.0 26.5 27.4 47.0 39.1 52.0 51.2 56.9 48.0 19.1 36.6
Uru 34.6 25.2 27.7 27.7 50.9 36.6 52.8 50.9 61.9 52.3 18.9 39.8
Ven 35.1 24.8 27.4 26.3 54.3 37.2 53.6 53.2 64.1 56.3 19.9 39.6
Characteristics effect
            Characteristics of country …
Arg Bra Chi Cos Ecu Els Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Arg 0.0 1.2 -8.0 -4.9 0.9 -7.0 3.4 5.2 8.0 -1.5 -0.9 -0.4
Bra 1.5 0.0 -7.9 -5.0 -0.2 -7.1 2.4 2.5 7.1 -1.0 -0.8 -1.2
Chi 8.3 7.3 0.0 3.2 6.5 3.0 9.0 9.0 12.6 5.7 6.9 6.6
Cos 7.7 5.0 -2.0 0.0 5.9 -1.6 7.2 6.7 11.2 3.9 4.2 2.8
Ecu -2.0 -1.5 -10.4 -6.9 0.0 -4.6 3.6 5.3 5.9 -4.9 -1.0 2.4
Els* -0.6 0.2 -13.4 -8.6 -2.2 0.0 1.3 3.3 7.9 -3.2 -5.8 -5.1
Mex -1.4 -0.5 -8.6 -7.0 -0.4 -3.8 0.0 3.4 5.8 -3.4 -2.6 -1.8
Nic -3.6 -2.9 -11.5 -10.5 -2.6 -7.5 -0.2 0.0 4.6 -5.9 -6.2 -3.9
Par** -4.7 -2.3 -8.2 -8.6 -1.9 -5.3 0.7 3.3 0.0 -7.1 -2.0 0.2
Per 3.8 8.5 -5.1 2.0 5.2 2.2 9.7 13.8 14.5 0.0 4.4 8.4
Uru 2.2 2.3 -6.1 -2.6 2.3 -1.9 4.1 5.3 7.5 0.3 0.0 1.0
Ven 0.6 0.7 -9.8 -4.5 1.1 -0.8 3.9 4.9 7.9 -3.1 0.2 0.0
Parameter effect
            Parameters of country…
Arg Bra Chi Cos Ecu Els* Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Arg 0.0 -8.1 -6.5 -4.3 14.4 6.2 18.4 18.0 23.6 16.2 -14.5 4.7
Bra 10.7 0.0 2.1 2.6 24.4 16.5 28.9 28.2 35.6 30.5 -4.8 14.3
Chi 6.7 -2.7 0.0 0.8 20.8 8.2 25.9 24.8 34.9 22.1 -8.1 9.0
Cos 7.1 -2.5 0.5 0.0 21.6 10.2 24.9 23.1 31.9 26.5 -7.2 11.6
Ecu -15.5 -26.1 -24.7 -22.5 0.0 -11.8 3.0 2.6 10.1 1.2 -30.8 -11.2
Els* -13.8 -23.5 -18.5 -20.4 5.0 0.0 9.3 7.3 16.3 7.8 -25.3 -3.5
Mex -16.4 -27.0 -25.6 -24.7 0.2 -11.8 0.0 1.6 9.3 2.4 -32.5 -11.9
Nic -16.3 -28.6 -27.3 -26.9 0.1 -11.5 1.7 0.0 10.1 4.7 -33.0 -12.6
Par** -20.4 -30.8 -30.5 -29.3 -6.1 -13.7 -2.7 -2.2 0.0 -1.5 -37.6 -16.4
Per -13.9 -23.0 -21.5 -20.6 -1.0 -8.9 4.0 3.2 8.9 0.0 -28.9 -11.4
Uru 15.7 6.3 8.8 8.9 32.0 17.7 33.9 32.1 43.0 33.5 0.0 21.0
Ven -4.5 -14.8 -12.2 -13.3 14.7 -2.4 14.0 13.6 24.5 16.7 -19.8 0.0
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
*  Domestic Servants and Public Administration sectors non defined 
** Domestic Servants sector non defined 
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Table 7.4 
Decomposition of informality rates 
Social Protection definition 
Sector informality rates of …
Argentina Brasil Chile Costa Rica Ecuador Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
Sectoral weights of …
Argentina 35.9 24.0 20.9 25.3 47.0 54.7 55.1 59.8 46.6 17.3 39.6
Brasil 37.6 26.0 22.0 27.2 49.8 56.8 58.2 63.7 49.2 19.4 41.8
Chile 36.4 26.2 21.0 26.1 51.3 57.9 59.1 64.6 48.5 18.5 42.9
Costa Rica 34.3 22.7 19.7 23.6 46.9 54.2 55.2 59.7 46.2 16.4 38.8
Ecuador 37.3 26.1 20.8 26.1 51.9 58.0 58.2 64.9 48.6 18.5 42.7
Mexico 36.7 24.1 20.1 24.9 50.2 55.3 57.5 63.7 48.4 17.8 40.6
Nicaragua 38.4 26.1 21.4 26.4 52.0 57.8 57.1 65.0 49.6 19.4 42.3
Paraguay ** 39.6 26.7 22.8 28.7 51.3 58.4 59.7 63.9 51.0 19.7 43.0
Peru 35.7 25.3 20.7 25.1 48.6 55.9 55.4 62.1 46.4 17.9 40.6
Uruguay 37.0 26.1 21.8 26.7 49.5 57.1 56.9 62.6 48.3 18.9 41.9
Venezuela 34.4 24.3 19.7 23.8 48.9 54.7 56.0 62.3 46.2 17.0 41.3
*  Domestic Servants and Public Administration sectors non defined
** Domestic Servants sector non defined
Composition effect
Sector informality rates of …
Arg Bra Chi Cos Ecu Mex Nic Par Per Uru Ven
Structure
Arg 0.0 -2.0 -0.1 1.7 -5.0 -0.7 -2.0 -4.1 0.2 -1.5 -1.7
Bra 1.7 0.0 1.1 3.6 -2.1 1.5 1.1 -0.2 2.8 0.5 0.5
Chi 0.5 0.2 0.0 2.6 -0.6 2.5 2.0 0.8 2.1 -0.3 1.6
Cos -1.6 -3.3 -1.2 0.0 -5.0 -1.2 -1.9 -4.2 -0.2 -2.5 -2.5
Ecu 1.4 0.1 -0.2 2.5 0.0 2.7 1.1 1.0 2.2 -0.3 1.3
Mex 0.8 -1.9 -0.8 1.3 -1.7 0.0 0.4 -0.2 2.0 -1.1 -0.7
Nic 2.5 0.1 0.4 2.9 0.0 2.4 0.0 1.1 3.2 0.5 1.0
Par 3.7 0.7 1.8 5.1 -0.6 3.1 2.6 0.0 4.6 0.9 1.6
Per -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 1.5 -3.3 0.6 -1.7 -1.7 0.0 -0.9 -0.7
Uru 1.2 0.1 0.9 3.1 -2.4 1.8 -0.2 -1.3 1.9 0.0 0.6
Ven -1.5 -1.7 -1.3 0.3 -3.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 -0.2 -1.8 0.0
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
 
Labor informality - CEDLAS 
 48
Figure 3.3 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
Salaried workers  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 3.7 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
All workers  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 3.8 
Informality rate 
Social protection definition 
All workers – all self-employed considered as informal 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 3.14 
Informality Rate 
Productive Definition  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 3.14 (cont.) 
Informality Rate 
Productive Definition  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
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Figure 6.1 
Relative wages formal/informal; relative number of workers formal/informal, and 
GDP 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Note: urban workers aged 15 to 70 without tertiary education 
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Figure 6.1 (cont.) 
Relative wages formal/informal; relative number of workers formal/informal, and 
GDP 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Note: urban workers aged 15 to 70 without tertiary education 
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Figure 6.1 (cont.) 
Relative wages formal/informal; relative number of workers formal/informal, and 
GDP 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
Note: urban workers aged 15 to 70 without tertiary education 
 
